While national surveillance programs have an important role have their own national influenza centers. The objectives of the WHO program were 2-fold: to gain an understanding of in monitoring the progress of both epidemic and pandemic influenza, it is the World Health Organization (WHO) global the epidemiology of influenza and to promptly isolate influenza viruses from new outbreaks and distribute them for vaccine influenza surveillance program that will determine the timeliness of our response to a future pandemic. I propose, therefore, production. to review this global program in the context of lessons already
The functions of WIC were essentially the same as the terms learned and our current understanding of the particular issues of reference of the three current WHO Collaborating Centres that influence the needs of a pandemic surveillance program for Influenza Reference and Research (London, Atlanta, Meland its likely effectiveness.
bourne; hereafter called the collaborating centers) [2]: (1) collecting and distributing information about the types of influenza virus prevailing in various countries; (2) advising on the strains Establishment of the WHO Surveillance Program to be included in influenza vaccines; (3) collecting, preserving, In 1947, only 12 years after the first successful cultivation and studying strains from various outbreaks and distributing of human influenza virus, a major antigenic change in the them to interested laboratories; and (4) educating small numcirculating influenza A strains was observed together with assobers of visiting workers in techniques. ciated vaccine failures. While we now know that the virus is
The surveillance program has now grown to include 110 capable of more radical changes than that seen in 1947, the designated National Influenza Centres (hereafter called national observation kindled concerns that the world might once again centers) in 80 countries and the 3 collaborating centers. Naexperience a devastating pandemic, such as occurred in 1918.
tional centers submit regular epidemiologic reports to WHO As a consequence, a group of virologists met during the 4th (Geneva) and, in many cases, forward virus isolates for antiInternational Congress for Microbiology held in Copenhagen genic analysis to 1 of the 3 collaborating centers. The collaboin 1947 and forwarded a recommendation to the Interim Comrating centers carry out antigenic analysis of the strains received mission of WHO that an international program be initiated for and do other studies that assist in the selection of vaccine influenza surveillance.
strains, including sequence analysis of the viral antigens and This recommendation was accepted at the fourth session of determination of immunity to current isolates in the population the WHO Interim Commission in September 1947, and the at large and in vaccinated persons. World Influenza Centre (WIC) was established at the National Since the initiation of the program, (1) it has been demonInstitute for Medical Research (London), which was to work strated that there are several distinct subtypes of influenza A, initially in close cooperation with a number of regional labora-(2) we have witnessed two pandemics plus the disappearance tories [1] . It was proposed that all countries might eventually and return of the H1N1 subtype, (3) nonhuman sources of influenza virus have been implicated in the origin of pandemic influenza, (4) there have been some significant changes in the way we carry out laboratory-based surveillance for influenza, S9 JID 1997;176 (Suppl 1) Surveillance for Pandemic Influenza bers of Chinese laborers into Europe, may account for a Chinese origin for this pandemic; however, this is a tenuous associsuccess in matching vaccine strains to the circulating epidemic viruses. However, it is important to consider how well the ation [5] . The fact that the pandemic appeared in three successive waves of quite different mortality is interesting in network might cope if a new pandemic virus arose today, because there are important differences between pandemic and view of the molecular evidence, referred to below regarding the origins of the virus; it appears that the virus appeared first epidemic situations. I propose to concentrate particularly on what we now know about the geographic and biologic origins in a relatively mild form, acquired its increased lethality on passage in humans, and then settled down to a less lethal form. of pandemic viruses, the implications for pandemic surveillance, and the potential opportunities to improve on the existing Despite the wealth of historical information on influenza pandemics, our most detailed data come from the two pandemglobal surveillance program. Finally, I will comment regarding the methods currently used in laboratory surveillance for influics that have occurred in the era of laboratory diagnosis. The 1957 (Asian) pandemic virus was first detected in Hong Kong enza.
in April and was quickly recognized as a new influenza A subtype. During May, the virus had already reached Japan and
Geographic Origins of Pandemic Influenza
Southeast Asia, and by June, it was found on the West Coast of the United States. In Japan, there were two epidemics: the Through the activities of the WHO laboratory network, there is good information regarding the spread of the Asian (H2N2) first in May through July and the second in September through December. While the virus spread into the North Temperate and Hong Kong (H3N2) pandemic viruses in 1957 and 1969, respectively, and regarding the reemergent H1N1 virus in 1977, Zone during spring and summer, in many cases the major outbreaks did not occur until autumn. A number of countries, together with approximate locations of their origins. However, because influenza produces such a characteristic disease, we including the United States, reported two waves in this pandemic [6] . Retrospectively, the first detection of the new virus can also trace the putative origins and spread of many earlier episodes, some of which were clearly pandemics, although was in southwestern China, where the disease was seen in February [7] . Apparently, the virus reached the outside world opinions vary as to which of the earlier outbreaks qualify as pandemics.
by two routes: along the Trans-Siberian Railway into the (then) USSR and by sea from Hong Kong to Singapore and Japan. Historical accounts serve to illustrate some of the important features of pandemic influenza. Summaries of pandemics since
The first indication of the 1968 (Hong Kong) pandemic virus was a report in mid-July of an outbreak in southeastern China; the 18th century and their probable geographic origins published by Patterson [3] and Beveridge [4] suggest that the mathis was followed a short time later by a sudden increase of influenza-like disease in Hong Kong. The spread of the 1968 jority of these arose in China, although central (Asian) Russia may have been the source of some earlier episodes (table 1) .
virus was initially very similar to that of the 1957 virus, with epidemics in Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries in However, there are also suggestions that those may also have originated in China -the major pandemic in 1781 -1782, for August. In Japan, the virus was introduced in September but failed to produce an epidemic until January [8] . [9] . The
On the other hand, genetic study or genetic archeology on the H1N1 descendants of the 1918 virus isolated during the virus spread a little more slowly than the Asian and Hong Kong strains and affected mainly younger members of the 1930s suggests that this virus was not formed by reassortment but rather by adaption of an avian virus to humans. It has been population. Retrospective reports indicated that the first outbreaks occurred in Tientsin, China, in May 1977 [10] .
suggested that this may have occurred following adaption in the pig as an intermediary [13] ; this may be consistent with From these observations, it has been concluded that there may be what has been referred to as an ''influenza epicenter'' the apparently different geographic origins of the 1918 virus.
There is no doubt that influenza viruses from pigs can infect in China [11] . It is also clear that the virus spreads very rapidly and tends to be less constrained by season than the usual epihumans and cause disease. This was demonstrated at Fort Dix in the United States in 1976 with the outbreak of A/New Jersey/ demic viruses; however, there may still be some seasonal influence, and this may be the reason that two waves of infection 76 virus, which was clearly derived from swine influenza virus [15] , and again recently in Europe, where there are two examare often experienced. Unfortunately, we still have no good information about the time course of spread of the virus from ples of transmission of human avian reassortant viruses from pigs to humans [16] . Because of the evidence of animal and its initial source until it is first seen as epidemic outbreaks. One of the main questions that arises from our experience become progressively accepted over the last 2 decades that influenza viruses from animals and birds are involved in this to date is whether the hemagglutinin of influenza virus may also contribute in some manner to host range restriction for process, and I shall give a brief overview of our current understanding of these events. The major surface antigen of influenza humans. Is it possible that only the H1, H2, and H3 subtypes will ever be found in humans? Shortridge's work [18] may A, hemagglutinin, has been shown to exist in 15 distinct forms or subtypes, and the minor antigen, neuraminidase, in 9 forms tempt us to believe not, as studies conducted on sera from various regions in China do show considerable evidence of [12] . It would now appear that aquatic birds, particularly ducks, are the primary host of influenza A viruses, and all of the antibody responses to a range of subtypes of influenza. The presence of an antibody response implies some replication of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes are found in them. A small number of subtypes have become established in mamthe virus in humans, even though this may be limited and inadequate for further transmission. As most of these subtypes malian species, and from time to time there is evidence that an avian virus has crossed into a mammalian species [13] .
have yet to be detected in the pig, it seems probable that humans have been infected directly from birds, implying that there We know that humans have been host to 3 influenza A hemagglutinin types during the last century, and each of these would be an opportunity for reassortment to occur directly in humans with existing human strains. has occurred on two separate occasions. Genetic analysis shows that the 1957 and 1969 viruses arose by genetic reassortment between the previously circulating human influenza strains and Requirements for Pandemic Surveillance an avian virus, such that the reassortant virus in both cases received the hemagglutinin and one nonstructural gene of the With respect to pandemic surveillance, the two primary goals of the WHO global program are to gain an understanding of avian virus and, in the case of the 1957 virus, the neuraminidase also. The fact that the Hong Kong virus had a common neurthe epidemiology of influenza and to promptly isolate influenza viruses from new outbreaks and distribute them for vaccine aminidase with the preceding subtype may account for the slightly lesser impact of this virus in some countries.
production.
/ 9d2e$$au03 06-30-97 17:10:39 jinfa UC: J Infect These goals are as relevant today as they were in 1947; of the gaps in the surveillance network, particularly in what we might term high-risk countries, where conditions may favor however, our success in dealing with a pandemic situation will depend on the time frame in which we can accomplish the animal-to-human transmission. Currently only Ç75% of the 110 listed WHO national centers are active, and these represent second goal. As noted earlier, our current surveillance is very much tailored to the epidemic situation; comparing the spread only 60 countries with active surveillance programs. On the other hand, recent surveillance in China has been significantly of a recent epidemic strain (A/Beijing/32/92) with the Hong Kong pandemic virus and the reemergent H1N1 strains emphaimproved by the availability of virus isolates for analysis from eight regional laboratories. These represent northern, central, sizes the markedly different time frames in which we must work (figure 1). It is worth remembering, however, that in both and southern regions of the country but tend to be concentrated toward the east. How can surveillance of human influenza out-1957 and 1969, the new strains were isolated and available to vaccine manufacturers within 6 weeks of the first outbreaks breaks be further improved in China? Would it be more effective to recruit additional contributing laboratories or to improve outside of China, and vaccine manufacture proceeded quickly. In the United States in 1957, almost 50 million doses of vaccine the expertise of existing laboratories and extend the surveillance network, providing clinical specimens to these laborahad been released by the time the epidemic peaked late in the year [19] .
tories? There are serious deficiencies in the WHO network in the region south of China. Here countries have high populations If the rate of spread of the last two pandemics is alarming, it seems certain that the next will spread even faster. If we and increasing trading contact with China, but few have national influenza centers. Active national centers in these counconsider China to be a likely source of the next pandemic, the relaxation of trade and tourism restrictions in that country will tries would be highly desirable.
On the other hand, we should not become preoccupied with surely spread the virus to other countries even more quickly than in the past. There is a particular risk of the next pandemic China as a possible influenza epicenter. The dubious origin of the 1918 virus, the Fort Dix episode, and the recent demonstravirus emerging through Southeast Asia, where our current surveillance is particularly poor. In addition, the vastly increased tion of transmission from pig to human in the Netherlands highlights the possibility that a new pandemic virus could arise air passenger services between countries must mean that the virus will spread around the globe more quickly than before.
virtually anywhere humans have close contact with birds or mammals that carry the virus. A number of areas where this In 1986, Longini et al. [20] reported applying, to the 1968 -1969 pandemic, a predictive model for spread of influenza could occur have little or no active surveillance. For example, in November 1993, the collaborating center in virus that had been developed in the (then) USSR some years earlier. The model showed a high level of predictive accuracy Australia received reports of an outbreak of influenza-like illness in a remote region of Papua New Guinea. Some 3000 -for the epidemic period in a number of major cities. The authors suggested that global modeling should be carried out in an 4000 cases had occurred over a 3-month period, with ú200 deaths among the very young and very old. Despite our best international context, perhaps within existing surveillance programs of WHO. Modeling the spread of an influenza pandemic efforts, we were unable to obtain any material for study (clinical specimens or postinfection sera), although an epidemiologist today using current passenger data might provide an interesting insight into the extent of the problem we will face. did travel to the area and reported that the outbreak was consistent with influenza. The outbreak failed to spread beyond the What can we do to maximize the time available and the speed of our pandemic response? First, we should fill in some New Guinea highlands; however, the domestic pig plays an / 9d2e$$au03 06-30-97 17:10:39 jinfa UC: J Infect important role in village agriculture in Papua New Guinea, of ferrets to raise our polyclonal reference sera. However, in many of the laboratories dealing with clinical specimens, there and it is not unthinkable that transmission of influenza viruses between human and pig occurs there and in many other develhave been quite significant changes. For example, monkey kidney culture progressively replaced embryonated eggs as the oping countries where there is little or no surveillance.
There are many impediments to improving the surveillance preferred culture system for isolating influenza viruses, and then for practical and ethical reasons, the MDCK cell line network, including lack of finance, trained scientists, and the necessary infrastructure in the countries concerned. In addition, replaced monkey kidney cells [23] .
The great majority of virus isolates available for analysis are influenza is a relatively low priority in many developing countries where there are more pressing and visible health concerns.
now cell culture isolates, and these have yet to gain regulatory acceptance for use as a vaccine. This carries the risk of an It is hard to imagine that, under today's conditions, the next pandemic virus will not be quickly transmitted beyond its additional delay between recognition of a new pandemic strain and its availability in a form acceptable for vaccine use. This source. The fact that the earliest apparent outbreaks of the 1957 Asian virus in China were only 2 -3 months ahead of those in delay, together with the demonstrated host-adaptive change that accompanies direct egg-isolation of influenza viruses, suggests Japan and Singapore suggests that increased surveillance of human influenza outbreaks in high-risk regions can have only that we should take steps to validate the standard laboratory culture system for influenza virus as a source of vaccine strains. a marginal effect on the overall time frame.
Are there other ways in which surveillance might provide a It may be fortunate that, for the moment, a few laboratories, including those in China, continue to use the embryonated egg longer time frame for our response? Is there a period when a new pandemic strain passes slowly through the population, for the isolation of influenza viruses. In addition, for some time it has been possible to make a becoming progressively adapted to the human host, or does it arise with full disease potential and transmissibility at the outdefinitive laboratory diagnosis of influenza by direct antigen detection methods, IFA, and EIA, and these are sufficient for set? The second, more severe outbreak in some pandemics suggests that the virus may progressively adapt to humans. If the majority of clinical diagnostic laboratories. As a result, many influenza A infections are not subtyped, and a new subthis is the case, is there any value in extending our surveillance to other indicators of human infection with new subtypes, such type may initially go undetected. A sensitive, rapid, and inexpensive direct antigen detection method that could identify an as the antibody studies reported by Shortridge [18] ?
If, as it seems, the domestic pig does indeed play an iminfluenza A virus and differentiate H1, H3, and non -H1 -H3 subtypes, similar to the rapid culture assay described recently portant role in the origin of human pandemic viruses, then surveillance for evidence of new hemagglutinin types in pigs [24] , would be invaluable for pandemic surveillance. Finally, it seems appropriate to conclude with the words of and, in particular, of human-avian reassortant viruses might allow us to anticipate the emergence of a new strain. If we Justin M. Andrews, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, in his foreword to the report of an internawere to assume that any of the avian hemagglutinin subtypes could yield the next pandemic virus, could we not use surveiltional conference on Asian influenza held in 1960 [25] . lance of the avian strains to provide us with potential vaccine strains? In the case of H2 and H3 viruses, the putative avian Through the years, man's life has been dramatically influprogenitor hemagglutinins were extremely closely related antienced by the sudden appearance of influenza in epidemic and pandemic forms. On each such occasion medical science has genically to the emerging viruses [21, 22] . There is the potential bestirred itself to study the disease intensively. Traditionally, to save several weeks in a vaccine production program by however, within a short span of time thereafter the upsurge preparing validated high-growth strains and the reagents for of interest in influenza research has begun to wane, leaving vaccine standardization. Finally, a key element in ensuring a only a few scientists with special research interests to continue timely response within our global program must be to have the elucidation of this particular disease. In spite of this feasta defined mechanism and criteria for declaring a pandemic or-famine approach, much has been learned and large strides situation.
have been taken toward a more complete understanding of the disease process.
Laboratory Methods of Surveillance
I hope the current meeting will encourage us to bestir ourselves Some comments on laboratory methods of surveillance are ahead of rather than after the next pandemic. also justified, as these may also be important in the context of our pandemic response. In the collaborating centers, many of our ''bread and butter'' methods for analysis of influenza virus
